Approximate Degree, Secret Sharing, and Concentration Phenomena by Bogdanov, Andrej et al.
Approximate Degree, Secret Sharing, and
Concentration Phenomena
Andrej Bogdanov
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Chinese University of Hong Kong
Institute for Theoretical Computer Science and Communications, Hong Kong
andrejb@cse.cuhk.edu.hk
Nikhil S. Mande
Department of Computer Science, Georgetown University, USA
nikhil.mande@georgetown.edu
Justin Thaler
Department of Computer Science, Georgetown University, USA
justin.thaler@georgetown.edu
Christopher Williamson
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
chris@cse.cuhk.edu.hk
Abstract
The ε-approximate degree d˜egε(f) of a Boolean function f is the least degree of a real-valued
polynomial that approximates f pointwise to within ε. A sound and complete certificate for
approximate degree being at least k is a pair of probability distributions, also known as a dual
polynomial, that are perfectly k-wise indistinguishable, but are distinguishable by f with advantage
1− ε. Our contributions are:
We give a simple, explicit new construction of a dual polynomial for the AND function on n
bits, certifying that its ε-approximate degree is Ω
(√
n log 1/ε
)
. This construction is the first
to extend to the notion of weighted degree, and yields the first explicit certificate that the
1/3-approximate degree of any (possibly unbalanced) read-once DNF is Ω(
√
n). It draws a novel
connection between the approximate degree of AND and anti-concentration of the Binomial
distribution.
We show that any pair of symmetric distributions on n-bit strings that are perfectly k-wise indis-
tinguishable are also statistically K-wise indistinguishable with at most K3/2 · exp
(
−Ω
(
k2/K
))
error for all k < K ≤ n/64. This bound is essentially tight, and implies that any symmetric
function f is a reconstruction function with constant advantage for a ramp secret sharing scheme
that is secure against size-K coalitions with statistical error K3/2 · exp
(
−Ω
(
d˜eg1/3(f)2/K
))
for all values of K up to n/64 simultaneously. Previous secret sharing schemes required that
K be determined in advance, and only worked for f = AND. Our analysis draws another new
connection between approximate degree and concentration phenomena.
As a corollary of this result, we show that for any d ≤ n/64, any degree d polynomial
approximating a symmetric function f to error 1/3 must have coefficients of `1-norm at
least K−3/2 · exp
(
Ω
(
d˜eg1/3 (f)
2 /d
))
. We also show this bound is essentially tight for any
d > d˜eg1/3(f). These upper and lower bounds were also previously only known in the case
f = AND.
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1 Introduction
The ε-approximate degree of a function f : {−1, 1}n → {0, 1}, denoted d˜egε(f), is the least
degree of a multivariate real-valued polynomial p such that |p(x)− f(x)| ≤ ε for all inputs
x ∈ {−1, 1}n.1 Such a p is said to be an approximating polynomial for f . This is a central
object of study in computational complexity, owing to its polynomial equivalence to many
other complexity measures including sensitivity, exact degree, deterministic and randomized
query complexity [20], and quantum query complexity [6].
By linear programming duality, f has ε-approximate degree more than k if and only
if there exist a pair of probability distributions µ and ν over the domain of f such that
µ and ν are perfectly k-wise indistinguishable (i.e., all k-wise projections of µ and ν are
identical), but are (1− ε)-distinguishable by f , namely EX∼µ[f(X)]− EY∼ν [f(Y )] ≥ 1− ε.
Said equivalently, a sound and complete certificate for ε-approximate degree being more than
k is a dual polynomial q = (µ − ν)/2 that contains no monomials of degree k or less, and
such that
∑
x |q(x)| = 1 and
∑
x q(x)f(x) ≥ ε.
Dual polynomials have immediate applications to cryptographic secret sharing: a dual
polynomial q = (µ− ν)/2 for f is a description of a cryptographic scheme for sharing a 1-bit
secret amongst n parties, where the secret can be reconstructed by applying f to the shares,
and the scheme is secure against coalitions of size k (see [4] for details).
Motivation for explicit constructions of dual polynomials. Recent years have seen signi-
ficant progress in proving new approximate degree lower bounds by explicitly constructing
dual polynomials exhibiting the lower bound [8, 24, 9, 25, 10, 7, 11, 27]. These new lower
bounds have in turn resolved significant open questions in quantum query complexity and
communication complexity. At the technical core of these results are techniques for construct-
ing a dual polynomial for composed functions f ◦ g := f(g, . . . , g), given dual polynomials
for f and g individually.
Often, an explicitly constructed dual polynomial showing that d˜egε(g) ≥ d exhibits
additional metric properties, beyond what is required simply to witness d˜egε(g) ≥ d. Much
of the major recent progress in proving approximate degree lower bounds has exploited
these additional metric properties [10, 7, 11, 27]. Accordingly, even if cases where an
approximate degree lower bound for a function g is known, it can often be useful to construct
an explicit dual polynomial witnessing the lower bound. Hence, we are optimistic that the
new constructions of dual polynomials given in this work will find future applications.
1 In this work, for convenience we also consider functions mapping {0, 1}n to {0, 1}.
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Explicit constructions of dual polynomials are also necessary to implement the corres-
ponding secret-sharing scheme, and to analyze the complexity of the algorithm that samples
the shares of the secret.
Our results in a nutshell. Our results fall into two categories. In the first category,
we reprove several known approximate degree lower bounds by giving the first explicit
constructions of dual polynomials witnessing the lower bounds. Specifically, our dual
polynomial certifies that the ε-approximate degree of the n-bit AND function is Θ(
√
n log 1/ε).
This construction is the first to extend to the notion of weighted degree, and yields the
first explicit certificate that the 1/3-approximate degree of any (possibly unbalanced) read-
once DNF is Ω(
√
n). Interestingly, our dual polynomial construction draws a novel and
clean connection between the approximate degree of AND and anti-concentration of the
Binomial distribution.
In the second category, we prove new and tight results about the size of the coefficients
of polynomials that approximate symmetric functions. Specifically, we show that for any
d ≤ n/64, any degree d polynomial approximating f to error 1/3 must have coefficients of
weight (`1-norm) at least d3/2 · exp
(
Ω
(
d˜eg1/3 (f)
2
/d
))
. We show this bound is tight (up
to logarithmic factors in the exponent) for any d > d˜eg1/3(f). These bounds were previously
only known in the case f = AND [23, 5]. Our analysis actually establishes a considerably
more general result, and as a consequence we obtain new cryptographic secret sharing schemes
with symmetric reconstruction procedures (see Section 1.2 for details).
1.1 A New Dual Polynomial for AND
To describe our dual polynomial for AND, it will be convenient to consider the AND function
to have domain {−1, 1}n and range {0, 1}, with AND(x) = 1 if and only if x = 1n. In their
seminal work, Nisan and Szegedy [20] proved that the 1/3-approximate degree of the AND
function on n inputs is Θ(
√
n). More generally, it is now well-known that the ε-approximate
degree of AND is Θ
(√
n log(1/ε)
)
[15, 6]. These works do not construct explicit dual
polynomials witnessing the lower bounds; this was achieved later in works of Špalek [28] and
Bun and Thaler [8].
Our first contribution is the construction of a new dual polynomial φ for AND, which is
simple enough to describe in a single equation:
φ(x) = (−1)
n
Z
(∏
i∈[n]
xi
)(
ES
∏
i∈S
xi
)2
. (1)
Here, S is a random subset of {1, . . . , n} of size at most 12 (n− d) (where d determines the
degree of the polynomials against which the exhibited lower bound holds), and Z is an
(explicit) normalization constant.
In the language of secret sharing, to share a secret s ∈ {−1, 1}, the dealer samples shares
x ∈ {−1, 1}n with probability proportional to (ES
∏
i∈S xi)2, conditioned on the parity of
the shares
∏
xi being equal to s.
In Corollary 8 we show that φ certifies that every degree-d polynomial must differ from
the AND function by 2−n
∑(n−d)/2
k=0
(
n
k
)
at some input. In other words, the approximation
error of a degree-d polynomial is lower bounded by the probability that a sum of unbiased
independent bits deviates from its mean by d/2.
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Our function φ given in (1), unlike previous dual polynomials [15, 28, 9, 26], also certifies
that the weighted 1/3-approximate degree of AND with weights w ∈ Rn≥0 is Ω(‖w‖2) (see
Corollary 9).2 This lower bound is tight for all w, matching an upper bound of Ambainis
[1]. The only difference in our dual polynomial construction for the weighted case is in
the distribution over sets S, and the lower bound in the weighted case is derived from
anti-concentration of weighted sums of Bernoulli random variables.
Both statements are corollaries of the following theorem.
I Theorem 1. Define AND : {−1, 1}n → {0, 1} as AND(x) = 1 if and only if x = 1n.
The function φ defined in Equation (1) is a dual witness for d˜egw,ε(AND) ≥ d for ε =
PrX∼{−1,1}n [〈w,X〉 ≥ d].
By combining, in a black-box manner, the dual polynomial for the weighted-approximate
degree of AND with prior work (e.g., [16, Proof of Theorem 7]), one obtains, for any read-once
DNF f , an explicit dual polynomial for the fact that d˜eg1/3(f) ≥ Ω(n1/2). Very recent work
of Ben-David et al. [2] established this result for the first time, shaving logarithmic factors
off of prior work [9, 16]. In fact, Ben-David et al. [2] prove more generally that any depth-d
read-once AND-OR formula has approximate degree 2−O(d)√n. Their method, however, does
not appear to yield an explicit dual polynomial, even in the case d = 2.
Discussion. It has been well known that the ε-approximate degree of the AND function
on n variables is Θ
(√
n log(1/ε)
)
[20, 6], a fact which has many applications in theoretical
computer science. This is superficially reminiscent of Chernoff bounds, which state that
the middle Θ
(√
n log(1/ε)
)
layers of the Hamming cube contain a 1 − ε fraction of all
inputs (i.e., “most” n-bit strings have Hamming weight close to n/2). However, these two
phenomena have not previously been connected, and it is not a priori clear why approximate
degree should be related to concentration of measure. An approximating polynomial p for f
must approximate f at all inputs in {−1, 1}n. Why should it matter that most (but very far
from all) inputs have Hamming weight close to n/2?
The new dual witness for AND constructed in Equation (1) above provides a surprising
answer to this question. The connection between (anti-)concentration and approximate
degree of AND arises not because of the number of inputs to f that have Hamming weight
close to n/2, but because of the number of parity functions on n bits that have degree close
to n/2. This connection appears to be rather deep, as evidenced by our construction’s ability
to yield a tight lower bound in the case of weighted approximate degree.
1.2 Indistinguishability for Symmetric Distributions
In this section, for convenience we consider functions mapping {0, 1}n to {0, 1}. Two
distributions µ and ν over {0, 1}n are (statistically) (k, δ)-wise indistinguishable if for all
subsets S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size k, the induced marginal distributions µ|S and ν|S are within
statistical distance δ. When δ = 0, we say they are (perfectly) k-wise indistinguishable.
2 For a polynomial p(x1, . . . , xn), a weight vector w ∈ Rn≥0 assigns weight wi to variable xi. The weighted
degree of p is the maximum weight over all monomials appearing in p, where the weight of a monomial
is the sum of the weights of the variables appearing within it. The weighted ε-approximate degree of f ,
denoted d˜egw,ε(f), is the least weighted degree of any polynomial that approximates f pointwise to
error ε.
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For general pairs of distributions, perfect k-wise indistinguishability does not imply any
sort of security against distinguishers of size k + 1. Any binary linear error-correcting code
of distance k + 1 and block length n induces a pair of distributions (the uniform distribution
over codewords and one of its affine shifts) that are perfectly k-wise indistinguishable, yet
perfectly (k + 1)-wise distinguishable.
In contrast, we prove that perfect k-wise indistinguishability for symmetric distributions
implies strong statistical security against larger adversaries:
I Theorem 2. If µ and ν are symmetric over {0, 1}n and perfectly k-wise indistinguishable,
then they are statistically (K,O(K3/2) · e−k2/1156K)-wise indistinguishable for all 1 ≤ k <
K ≤ n/64.
Theorem 2 has the following direct consequence for secret sharing schemes over bits
with symmetric reconstruction. We say (µ, ν) are α-reconstructible by f if EX∼µ[f(X)]−
EY∼ν [f(Y )] ≥ α.
I Corollary 3. Let f be a symmetric Boolean function. There exists a pair of distributions
µ and ν that are
(
K,K3/2 · e−Ω(d˜eg1/3(f)2/K)
)
-indistinguishable for all K ≤ n/64, but are
Ω(1)-reconstructible by f .
Corollary 3 is an immediate consequence of our Theorem 2, and the fact that any
symmetric function has an optimal dual polynomial that is itself symmetric. In the special
case f = AND (or equivalently f = OR), Corollary 3 implies the existence of a visual secret
sharing scheme (see, for example [19]) that is
(
K,K3/2 · e−Ω(n/K))-statistically secure against
all coalitions of size K, simultaneously for all K up to size n/64. This property, where
security guarantees are in place for many coalition sizes at the same time, is in contrast to an
earlier result of Bogdanov and Williamson [5] where they proved that for any fixed coalition
size K, there is a visual secret sharing scheme that is (K, e−Ω(n/K))-statistically secure. In
their construction, the distribution of shares µ and ν depend on the value of K.
We remark that the bound of Corollary 3 cannot hold in general for K = n, since there
exists distributions that are perfectly Ω(n)-wise indistinguishable but are reconstructible
by the majority function on all n inputs. We do not however know if a bound of the form
K ≤ (1− Ω(1))n is tight in this context.
Tight weight-degree tradeoffs for polynomials approximating symmetric functions
Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be any function. For any integer d ≥ 0, denote by Wε(f, d) the
minimum weight of any degree-d polynomial that approximates f pointwise to error ε. By
the weight of a polynomial, we mean the `1-norm of its coefficients over the parity (Fourier)
basis3. In Section B, we observe that Corollary 3 implies weight-degree trade-off lower bounds
for symmetric functions.
I Corollary 4. For any symmetric function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, any constant ε ∈ (0, 1/2),
and any integer K where n/64 ≥ K ≥ d˜egε(f), we have Wε(f,K) ≥ K−3/2 ·2Ω
(
d˜eg1/3(f)2/K
)
.
The following theorem shows that the lower bound obtained in Corollary 4 is tight (up to
polylogarithmic factors in the exponent) for all symmetric functions.
3 In fact, our main weight lower bound (Corollary 4) holds over any set of functions (not just parities)
that each depend on at most d variables.
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I Theorem 5. For any symmetric function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, any constant ε ∈ (0, 1/2)
and K > d˜egε(f) ·
√
logn, Wε(f,K) ≤ 2O˜(d˜eg1/3(f)
2/K).4
Theorem 5 also implies that Corollary 3 is tight (up to polylogarithmic factors in the
exponent) for all symmetric f and for all K ≥ d˜eg1/3(f)
√
logn. This is because any
improvement to Corollary 3 would yield an improvement to Corollary 4, contradicting
Theorem 5.
Essentially Optimal Ramp Visual Secret Sharing Schemes. The following result shows
that in the case f = AND, Corollary 3 is essentially tight for all K ≥ 2, and Theorem 2 is tight
as a reduction from perfect to approximate indistinguishability for symmetric distributions.
It does so by constructing essentially optimal ramp visual secret sharing schemes.5
I Theorem 6. For all 2 ≤ k < K ≤ n there exist symmetric k-wise indistinguishable
distributions µ and ν over n-bit strings that are
√
2−4K+3 ·∑d>k ( 2KK+d)2-reconstructible by
ANDK , where ANDK(x) is the AND of the first K bits of x.
Discussion of Theorem 6. This theorem gives the existence of a ramp visual secret sharing
scheme that is perfectly secure against any k parties, but in which any K > k parties can
reconstruct the secret with the above advantage. This generalizes the schemes in [5] where
only reconstruction by all n parties was considered.
Let us express the reconstruction advantage appearing in Theorem 6 in a manner more
easily comparable to other results in this manuscript. Standard results on anti-concentration
of the Binomial distribution state that 2−2K ·∑d>k ( 2KK+d) = e−Θ(k2/K) (see, e.g., [17]). The
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality then implies that the reconstruction advantage appearing in
Theorem 6 is at least K−1/2 · e−O(k2/K).6
Hence, the visual secret sharing schemes given in Theorem 6 are nearly optimal; if the
reconstruction advantage could be improved by more than the leading poly(K) factor (or the
constant factor in the exponent), then this would contradict Theorem 2 which upper bounds
the distinguishing advantage of any statistical test over K bits against symmetric, perfectly
k-wise indistinguishable distributions. Theorem 6 also shows that the indistinguishability
parameter in Theorem 2 cannot be significantly improved, even in the restricted case where
the only statistical test is ANDK .
In Section 4 we describe another application of Theorem 2 to security against share
consolidation and “downward self-reducibility” of visual secret shares.
4 Here and throughout, the O˜ notation hides polylogarithmic factors in n.
5 A visual secret sharing scheme is a scheme where the reconstruction function is the AND of some subset
of the shares. A ramp scheme is one where there is not necessarily a sharp threshold between the perfect
secrecy and reconstruction thresholds; in particular, we allow for K > k + 1.
6 Theorem 6 is closely related to Theorem 1, in that Theorem 6 gives another anti-concentration-based
proof that d˜egε(ANDK) ≥ k for ε = K−1/2 · e−Θ(k
2/K). However, the two results are incomparable.
Theorem 6 does not yield an explicit dual polynomial for ANDK , and the ε-approximate degree lower
bound for ANDK implied by Theorem 6 is loose by the K−1/2 factor appearing in the expression for ε.
On the other hand, Theorem 1 only yields a visual secret sharing scheme with reconstruction by all n
parties, while Theorem 6 yields a ramp scheme with non-trivial reconstruction advantage by the AND
of the first K (out of n) parties.
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1.3 Related Works
Prior Work. Servedio, Tan, and Thaler [23] established Corollary 4 and Theorem 5 in
the special case f = OR, showing that degree d polynomials that approximate the OR
function require weight 2Θ˜(n/d) = 2Θ˜(d˜eg1/3(OR)
2/d).7 They used this result to establish tight
weight-degree tradeoffs for polynomial threshold functions computing decision lists. As
previously mentioned, Bogdanov and Willamson [5] generalized the weight-vs-degree lower
bound from [23] beyond polynomials, thereby obtaining a visual secret-sharing scheme for
any fixed K that is (K, e−Ω(n/K))-statistically secure.
Elkies [13] and Sachdeva and Vishnoi [22] exploit concentration of measure to prove a
tight upper bound on the degree of univariate polynomials that approximate the function
t 7→ tn over the domain [−1, 1]. Their techniques inspired our (much more technical) proof
of Theorem 2.
Other Related Work. This work subsumes Bogdanov’s manuscript [3], which shows a
slightly weaker lower bound on the weighted approximate degree of AND, and does not derive
an explicit dual polynomial. In independent work, Huang and Viola [14] prove a weaker form
of our Corollary 3: their distributions µ, ν depend on the value of K. They also prove (a
slightly tighter version of) Theorem 5, thereby establishing that the statistical distance in
Corollary 3 is tight.
1.4 Techniques and Organization
The proof of Theorem 1 (Section 2) is an elementary verification that the function φ given in
(1) is a dual polynomial. The only property that is not immediate is correlation with AND.
Verifying this property amounts to upper bounding the normalization constant Z, which
follows from orthogonality of the Fourier characters.
In the proof of Theorem 2 (Section 3), a K-bit statistical distinguisher for symmetric
distribution is first decomposed into a sum of at most K + 1 tests Qw that evaluate to 1
only when the input has Hamming weight exactly w. Lemma 13 shows that the univariate
symmetrizations pw of these distinguishers can be pointwise approximated by a degree-k
polynomial with error at most O(K1/2) · e−Ω(k2/K).
To construct the desired approximation, we derive an identity relating the moment
generating function of the squared Chebyshev coefficients of pw (interpreted as relative
probabilities) to the average magnitude of a polynomial g related to pw on the unit complex
circle (Claims 16 and 17). We bound these magnitudes analytically (Claim 18) and derive tail
inequalities for the Chebyshev coefficients from bounds on the moment generating function
as in standard proofs of Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds.
In the special case when the secrecy parameters k and K are fixed and the number of
parties n approaches infinity, pw(t) turns out to equal Cw(t− 1)w(t+ 1)K−w, where Cw is
some quantity independent of t. In this case, the Chebyshev coefficients are the regular
coefficients of the polynomial g∞(s) = 2−wCw(s− 1)2w(s+ 1)2(K−w).8 When w = 0, K/2,
or 1, the coefficients of g∞ are exponentially concentrated around the middle as they follow
7 These bounds for OR were implicit in [23], but not explicitly highlighted. The upper bound was explicitly
stated in [12, Lemma 4.1], which gave applications to differential privacy, and the lower bound in [9,
Lemma 32], which used it to establish tight weight-degree tradeoffs for polynomial threshold functions
computing read-once DNFs.
8 The i-th coefficient of g∞ is the value of the i-th Kravchuk polynomial with parameter 2K evaluated at
2w.
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the binomial distribution. We prove that this exponential decay in magnitudes happens
for all values of w, which requires understanding complicated cancellations in the algebraic
expansion of g∞(s).
We generalize this analysis to the finitary setting n ≥ 64K.
We prove Theorem 5 (Section B) by writing any symmetric function f as a sum of at
most ` := min{|f−1(0)|, |f−1(1)|} many conjunctions, and approximating each conjunction
to such low error (namely error  `) that the sum of all approximations is an approximation
for f itself. Theorem 5 then follows by constructing low-weight, low-degree polynomial
approximations for each conjunction in the sum.
Theorem 6 (Section C) is proved by lower bounding the error of degree k polynomial
approximations to the symmetrization f of the function ANDK
(
x|{1,...,K}
)
. By duality, a
lower bound on approximation error translates into a secret sharing scheme with the same
reconstruction advantage. To lower bound the error, we estimate the values of the coefficients
in the Chebyshev expansion of f with indices larger than k. Owing to orthogonality, the
largest of these coefficients lower bounds the approximation error of any degree-k polynomial.
In Section 4 we formulate a security of secret sharing against consolidation and downward
self-reducibility of visual schemes, and derive these properties from the main results.
2 Dual Polynomial For the Weighted Approximate Degree of AND
In this section we prove Theorem 1 and derive its two corollaries about the unweighted and
weighted approximate degree of AND.
Notation and Definitions. Let [n] = {1, . . . , n}. Given a vector w ∈ Rn≥0, define the weight
of a monomial χS(x) =
∏
i∈S xi, xi ∈ {−1, 1} to equal
∑
i∈S wi. Define the w-weighted degree
of a polynomial to be the maximum weight of a monomial in it. That is, if p =
∑
S⊆[n] cSχS ,
then define
degw(p) = max
S:cS 6=0
w(S).
Define the w-weighted ε-approximate degree d˜egw,ε(f) to be the minimum w-weighted degree
of a polynomial p that satisfies |p(x)− f(x)| ≤ ε for all x in the domain of f . Given two
real-valued functions f, g over domain {−1, 1}n, define 〈f, g〉 := 12n
∑
x∈{−1,1}n f(x) · g(x).
I Lemma 7. For any finite set X and any function f : X → R, d˜egw,ε(f) ≥ d iff there
exists a function φ : X → R satisfying the following conditions.
Pure high degree: For any real polynomial p of weighted degree is at most d, 〈φ, p〉 = 0.
Normalization:
∑
x∈X |φ(x)| = 1,
Correlation: 〈φ, f〉 ≥ ε,
We call φ a dual witness for d˜egw,ε(f) ≥ d. The lemma follows by linear programming
duality and is a straightforward generalization of previous results (see e.g. [28, 9]). We prove
the “if” direction, which is sufficient for our purposes.
Proof. For any p of weighted degree at most d,
‖f − p‖∞ = ‖f − p‖∞‖φ‖1 ≥ 〈φ, f − p〉 = 〈φ, f〉 − 〈φ, p〉 ≥ ε. J
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The dual polynomial of interest is
φ(x) = (−1)
n
Z
χ[n](x) · ES∼H[χS(x)]2,
where x ∈ {−1, 1}n, H is the uniform distribution over the sets {S ⊆ [n] : w(S) ≤ (‖w‖1 −
d)/2}, and Z is the normalization constant
Z =
∑
x∈{−1,1}n
ES∼H[χS(x)]2.
Proof of Theorem 1. We prove the theorem by showing that φ satisfies the three conditions
of Lemma 7. The expression ES∼H[χS(x)]2 can be written as a sum of products of pairs of
monomials of weight at most (‖w‖1 − d)/2, so its weighted degree is at most ‖w‖1 − d. Thus
every monomial that occurs in the expansion of χ[n](x)ES∼H[χS(x)]2 must have weighted
degree at least d, and so φ has pure high weighted degree at least d as desired.
The scaling by Z in the definition of φ ensures that φ has L1 norm 1. The correlation
of φ and AND is given by 〈φ,AND〉 = φ(1n) = 1Z . Finally, the normalization constant Z
evaluates to
Z =
∑
x∈{−1,1}n
ES∼H[χS(x)]2 =
∑
x∈{−1,1}n
ES∼H[χS(x)]ET∼H[χT (x)]
=
∑
x∈{−1,1}n
ES,T∼H[χS∆T (x)] = ES,T∼H
∑
x∈{−1,1}n
χS∆T (x)
= 2n Pr[S = T ] = 2
n
|H| ,
since the inner summation over x evaluates to 2n when S = T , and zero otherwise.
It remains to show that 1/Z = |H|/2n equals the desired expression for ε. For a set
S ⊆ [n], let X(S) ∈ {−1, 1}n be the string that assigns values 1 and −1 to elements inside
and outside S, respectively. Then w(S) = ‖w‖1/2 + 〈w,X(S)〉/2, so
|H|
2n = PrS⊆[n][w(S) ≥ ‖w‖1/2 + d/2] = PrX∼{−1,1}n [〈w,X〉 ≥ d]. J
I Corollary 8 (Approximate degree of AND). Recall that AND : {−1, 1}n → {0, 1} denotes
the function satisfying AND(x) = 1 if and only if x = 1n. If p has degree at most d, then
|p(x) − AND(x)| ≥ Pr[X ≤ (n − d)/2] for some x, where X is a Binomial(n, 1/2) random
variable.
The expression on the right is lower bounded by the larger of 1/2−O(d/√n) and 2−O(d2/n).
In the large d regime (d ≥ √n), this bound is tight [15, 6].
Proof. Apply Theorem 1 to the weight vector w = (1, 1, . . . , 1). J
Earlier constructions of dual polynomials for AND are quite different from our Corollary 8
[15, 28, 9, 26] and are based on real-valued polynomial interpolation. Specifically, for a
carefully chosen set T ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , n} of size |T | = 2d, the prior constructions consider a
univariate polynomial p(t) =
∏
i∈[n]\T (t− i), and they define ψ(x) = p(|x|), where |x| denotes
the Hamming weight of x. Clearly ψ has degree at most n − |T |. A fairly complicated
calculation is required to show that, for an appropriate choice of T , defining ψ in this way
ensures that |ψ(1n)| captures an ε-fraction of the L1-mass of ψ.
I Corollary 9 (Weighted approximate degree of AND). d˜egw,3/32(AND) ≥ ‖w‖2/2.
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The proof uses the Paley-Zygmund inequality:
I Lemma 10 (Paley-Zygmund inequality). Let Z ≥ 0 be any random variable with finite
variance. Then, for any 0 < θ < 1,
Pr[Z ≥ θE(Z)] ≥ (1− θ)2 (E[Z])
2
E[Z2] .
Proof of Corollary 9. We apply the Paley-Zygmund inequality to 〈w,X〉2. First,
E[〈w,X〉]2 = ‖w‖22 and E[〈w,X〉4] =
∑
w4i + 3
∑
w2iw
2
j ≤ 3‖w‖22. Then
Pr
[
〈w,X〉 ≥ ‖w‖22
]
= 12 Pr
[
|〈w,X〉| ≥ ‖w‖22
]
= 12 Pr
[
〈w,X〉2 ≥ ‖w‖
2
2
4
]
≥ 12 ·
9
16 ·
1
3 =
3
32 ,
where the first equality follows from the sign-symmetry of X. Applying Theorem 1 with
d = ‖w‖2/2 yields the claim. J
3 Approximate Indistinguishability from Perfect Indistinguishability
In this section, we prove Theorem 2, which states that any pair of symmetric and perfectly
k-wise indistinguishable distributions over {0, 1}n are also approximately indistinguishable
against statistical tests that observe K > k of the bits. We may and will assume without
loss of generality that the statistical test is a symmetric function,9 meaning that it depends
only on the Hamming weight of the observed bits of its input.
Let X and Y denote an arbitrary pair of symmetric (k, 0)-wise indistinguishable distribu-
tions over {0, 1}n. We will be interested in obtaining an upper bound on the statistical distance
of their projections to any K indices of [n], namely the advantage EX [T (X|S)− EY [T (Y |S)]
where T : {0, 1}K → {0, 1} is a symmetric function and S ⊆ [n] is any set of size K. We can
decompose T into a sum of tests Qw : {0, 1}K → {0, 1}, where Qw outputs 1 if and only if
the Hamming weight of its input is exactly w. Specifically, we decompose T as
T =
K∑
w=0
bwQw, (2)
where each bw is either zero or one. We will bound the distinguishing advantage of each
Qw in the sum individually. This advantage is captured by a univariate function pw that
expresses Qw in terms of the Hamming weight of its input, after shifting and scaling the
Hamming weight to reside in the interval [−1, 1].
I Fact 11. Let S ⊆ [n] be any set of size K. There exists a univariate polynomial pw of
degree at most K such that the following holds. For all t ∈ {−1,−1 + 2/n, . . . , 1− 2/n, 1},
pw(t) = EZ [Qw(Z|S)] where Z is a random string of Hamming weight φ−1(t) = (1− t)n/2 ∈
{0, 1, . . . , n}.
Proof. This statement is a simple extension of Minsky and Papert’s classic symmetrization
technique [18]. Specifically, Minsky and Papert showed that for any polynomial pn : {0, 1}n →
R, there exists a univariate polynomial P of degree at most the total degree of pn, such that
for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, P (i) = E|x|=i[pn(x)]. Apply this result to pn(x) = Qw(x|S) and let
pw(t) = P (φ−1(t)) = P ((1− t)n/2). The fact then follows from the observation that the
total degree of Qw(x|S) is at most K, since this function is a K-junta. J
9 In the full version, we include simple proofs that (1) the marginal distributions of a symmetric
distribution are symmetric and that (2) the best distinguisher between a pair of symmetric distributions
is a symmetric function.
A. Bogdanov, N. S. Mande, J. Thaler, and C. Williamson 71:11
In particular, the value pw(t) is a probability for every t ∈ {−1,−1 + 2/n, . . . , 1− 2/n, 1}.
Moreover, this probability must equal zero when the Hamming weight of Z is less than w or
greater than n −K + w. Therefore pw has K distinct zeros at the points Zw = Z− ∪ Z+,
where
Z− = {−1 + 2h/n : h = 0, ...,K − w − 1} , Z+ = {1− 2h/n : h = 0, ..., w − 1}. (3)
and so pw must have the form
pw(t) = Cw ·
∏
z∈Zw
(t− z) (4)
for some Cw that does not depend on t.10 As pw(t) is probability when t ∈ {−1,−1 +
2/n, . . . , 1− 2/n, 1}, the function pw is 1-bounded at those inputs. In fact, pw is uniformly
bounded on the interval [−1, 1]:
B Claim 12. Assuming n ≥ 64K, |pw(t)| ≤ 2 for all t ∈ [−1, 1].
The proof is omitted due to space limitations but follows a similar structure as the proof
of Claim 18 which appears in Section A. Formula (4) and Claim 12 will be applied to show
that pw has a good uniform polynomial approximation on the interval [−1, 1].
I Lemma 13. Assuming n ≥ 64K, there exists a degree-k polynomial qw such that
|pw(t)− qw(t)| ≤ 4
√
K exp(−k2/1156K) for all t ∈ [−1, 1].
Lemma 13 is the main technical result of this section. It is proved in Section 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 2. Now let T be a general distinguisher on K inputs, which we may and
will assume to be a symmetric Boolean-valued function. We bound the distinguishing advant-
age as follows. Recalling that X and Y are (k, 0)-indistinguishable symmetric distributions
over {0, 1}n, for any set S ⊆ [n] of size K we have:
E[T (X|S)]− E[T (Y |S)]
=
K∑
w=0
bw
(
E[Qw(X|S)]− E[Qw(Y |S)]
)
(by (2))
≤
K∑
w=0
∣∣E[Qw(X|S)]− E[Qw(Y |S)]∣∣ (by boundedness of bw)
=
K∑
w=0
∣∣E[pw(φ(|X|)]− E[pw(φ(|Y |))]∣∣ (by symmetry of X,Y , and Fact 11)
≤
K∑
w=0
∣∣E[qw(φ(|X|))]− E[qw(φ(|Y |))]∣∣+ 8√K exp(−k2/1156K) (by Lemma 13)
= O(K3/2) · e−k2/1156K (by k-wise indistinguishability of X,Y )
Therefore, X and Y are (K,O(K3/2) · e−k2/1156K)-wise indistinguishable for 2 ≤ K ≤
n/64. J
10 pw, Cw, and Zw also depend on K and n but we omit those arguments from the notation as they will
be fixed in the proof.
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3.1 Proof of Lemma 13
We will prove Lemma 13 by studying the Chebyshev expansion of pw. To this end we take a
brief detour into Chebyshev polynomials and an even briefer one into Fourier analysis.
Chebyshev polynomials
The Chebyshev polynomials are a family of real polynomials {Td}, 1-bounded on [−1, 1],
with Td having degree d. We extend the definition to negative indices by setting T−d = Td.
The Chebyshev polynomials are orthogonal with respect to the measure dσ(t) = (1 −
t2)−1/2dt supported on [−1, 1]. Therefore every degree-K polynomial p : R→ R has a unique
(symmetrized) Chebyshev expansion
p(t) =
K∑
d=−K
cdTd(t), c−d = cd
where c−K , . . . , cK are the Chebyshev coefficients of p.
The Chebyshev polynomials satisfy the following identity, which plays an important role
in our analysis:
I Fact 14. t · Td(t) = 12Td−1(t) + 12Td+1(t).
This formula, together with the “base cases” T0(t) = 1 and T1(t) = t, specifies all Chebyshev
polynomials.
We will also need the following form of Parseval’s identity for univariate polynomials.
B Claim 15 (Parseval’s identity). For every complex polynomial h, the sum of the squares
of the magnitudes of the coefficients of h equals Ez[|h(z)|2], where z is a random complex
number of magnitude 1.
Proof outline
We will argue that the Chebyshev expansion
∑K
d=−K cdTd(t) of pw(t) has small weight on
the coefficients cd when |d| > k. Zeroing out those coefficients then yields a good degree-k
approximation of pw as desired.
The upper bound on the Chebyshev coefficients of pw is derived in two steps. The first
step, which is of an algebraic nature, expresses the Chebyshev coefficients of pw as regular
coefficients of a related polynomial g.11 We are interested in the coefficients of the derived
polynomial gε(s) = g((1 + ε)s), which represent the Chebyshev coefficients cd of pw amplified
by the exponential scaling factor (1 + ε)d.
The second step, which is analytic, upper bounds the magnitude of the coefficients of
gε(s). The main tool is Parseval’s identity, which identifies the sum of the squares of these
coefficients by the average magnitude of gε over the complex unit circle Eθ |g((1 + ε)eiθ)|2.
We bound the maximum magnitude maxθ |g((1 + ε)eiθ)|2 by explicitly analyzing the function
g. This step comprises the bulk of our proof.
The third step translates the bound on the squared 2-norm
∑K
d=−K(1 + ε)2dc2d of the
amplified coefficients into a tail bound on cd by optimizing over a suitable value of ε. This
is analogous to the standard derivation of Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds by analysis of the
moment generating function of the relevant random variable.
11We omit the dependence on w as this parameter remains constant throughout the proof.
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We now sketch how this outline is executed for the special case where n tends to infinity
while k and K remain fixed. Although this setting is technically much easier, it allows us
to highlight the main conceptual points of our argument. The analysis for finite n can be
viewed as an approximation of this proof strategy.
Sketch of the limiting case n→∞
By the expansion (4) of pw, as n tends to infinity pw converges uniformly to the function
p∞w (t) = Cw · (t− 1)w(t+ 1)K−w,
as this corresponds to Fact 11 when the bits of the string Z are independent and (1− t)/2-
biased. As p∞w (t) is a probability for every t ∈ [−1, 1], Claim 12 follows immediately.
Step 1. Our algebraic treatment of the Chebyshev transform yields that the Chebyshev
coefficient cd of p∞w is the (K + d)-th regular coefficient of the polynomial
g∞(s) = Cw
(
s− 1√
2
)2w (
s+ 1√
2
)2(K−w)
. (5)
Step 2. The evaluation of the polynomial g∞ε (s) = g∞((1 + ε)s) at s = eiθ satisfies the
identity
∣∣g∞ ((1 + ε)eiθ)∣∣ = (1 + ε)K · (1 + δ)K · Cw · (1− cos θ1 + δ
)w (
1 + cos θ1 + δ
)K−w
, (6)
where δ = ε2/2(1 + ε). This happens to equal
(1 + ε)K(1 + δ)Kpw(cos θ/(1 + δ)), (7)
and is in particular uniformly bounded by (1 + ε)K(1 + δ)K for all θ. This similarity between
p∞ and g∞ε is the crux of our analysis.
Step 3. By Parseval’s identity, after suitable shifting and cancellation, the amplified sum
of Chebyshev coefficients
∑K
d=−K(1 + ε)2dc2d is upper bounded by (1 + δ)2K . Therefore the
tail
∑
k≥d c
2
d can have value at most (1 + δ)2K/(1 + ε)2k ≤ exp(2Kε2 − 2(ε− ε2/2)k). This
upper bound holds for all ε ∈ [0, 1], and plugging in the approximate minimizer ε = k/2K
yields a bound of the desired form exp(−Ω(k2/K)).
Outline of the general case
We now give the outline of our full proof for the general case and relevant technical statements
that we use to prove our main upper bound. Identity (5) generalizes to the following statement:
B Claim 16. The Chebyshev coefficient cd of pw is the (K + d)-th regular coefficient of the
polynomial
g(s) = Cw
∏
z∈Zw
(
s2 − 2sz + 1
2
)
,
where Cw is as in Equation (4).
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The general form of identity (6) is:
B Claim 17. For ε > 0, δ = ε2/2(1 + ε), and θ ∈ [−pi, pi],∣∣g((1 + ε)eiθ)∣∣2 = (1 + ε)2K(1 + δ)2K · C2w ∏
z∈Zw
hδ(1+1/(1+δ))
(
cos θ
1 + δ , z
)
where hδ(s, z) = (s− z)2 + δ(1− z2).
Owing to the second term in hδ, there is no identity analogous to (7) when n is finite
and pw has zeros inside (−1, 1). Nevertheless,
∏
z∈Zw hδ(s, z) can be uniformly bounded
either by a sufficiently small multiple of pw(s)2, or a fixed quantity that is constant in the
parameter range of interest.
B Claim 18. Assume n ≥ 64K and w ≤ K/2. Then
C2w ·
∏
z∈Zw
hδ(s, z) ≤
{
e65δK · pw(s)2 if |s| ≤ 1− w/16K
e65δK if 1− w/16K ≤ |s| ≤ 1.
We now prove Lemma 13. Due to space limitations, we omit the proof of Claim 16,
which follows via induction and is an application of Fact 14, and the proof of Claim 17,
which consists of a lengthy but relatively straightforward calculation. Claim 18 is proved in
Section A.
I Fact 19. pw(t) = pK−w(1− t).
Proof. By Fact 11, both sides are degree-K polynomials that agree on n+ 1 > K points so
they are identical. J
Proof of Lemma 13. By Fact 19 we may and will assume that w ≤ K/2. Let pw =∑K
d=−K cdTd. The approximating polynomial qw is
∑
|d|<k cdTd. It remains to prove a tail
upper bound on the Chebyshev coefficients. By Claim 16, the (K + d)-th coefficient of g(s)
is cd. Therefore the polynomial gε(s) = g((1 + ε)s) has coefficients (1 + ε)K+dcd as d ranges
from −K to K. We apply Parseval’s identity (Claim 15) to gε.
It follows that
K∑
d=−K
(1 + ε)2(K+d)c2d = Eθ |g((1 + ε)eiθ)|2
≤ max
θ∈[−pi,pi]
|g((1 + ε)eiθ)|2
= max
s∈[−1,1]
(1 + ε)2K(1 + δ)2K · C2w
∏
z∈Zw
hδ(1+1/(1+δ))(s/(1 + δ), z),
by Claim 17. Since 0 ≤ δ = ε2/2(1 + ε) ≤ 1/2, for simplicity we may replace
hδ(1+1/(1+δ))(s/(1 + δ), z) by h2δ(s, z) in the above inequality. This gives the following
approximation bound for α = maxt∈[−1,1] |pw(t)− qw(t)|:
α = max
t∈[−1,1]
∣∣∣∑|d|≥k cdTd(t)∣∣∣
≤
∑
|d|≥k |cd| maxt∈[−1,1] |Td(t)|
≤ 2
∑
d≥k
|cd| (by symmetry and boundedness of Td)
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. . . ≤ 2
√
K ·
√∑
d≥k c
2
d (by Cauchy-Schwarz)
≤ 2
√
K ·
√
(1 + ε)−2(K+k)
∑
d≥k(1 + ε)
2(K+d)c2d
≤ 2
√
K
√
(1 + ε)−2k · (1 + δ)2K · max
s∈[−1,1]
C2w
∏
z∈Zw
h2δ(s, z).
By the boundedness of pw (Claim 12), the upper bounds in Claim 18 can be unified by
the inequality C2w
∏
z∈Zw h2δ(s, z) ≤ 4e130δK that is valid for all s ∈ [−1, 1]. Since 1 + δ ≤ eδ
and 1 + ε ≥ eε−ε2/2 for 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1,
α ≤ 2
√
K ·
√
(1 + δ)2K
(1 + ε)2k · 4e
130δK ≤ 4
√
K ·
√
e132δK−2εk+ε2k ≤ 4
√
K ·
√
e67ε2K−2εk,
where the last inequality follows from the definition δ = ε2/2(1 + ε). Setting ε = k/34K we
obtain that α ≤ 4√K · e−k2/1156K . J
4 Robustness of Symmetric Secret Sharing Against Consolidation
Consider a secret sharing scheme with tn parties, divided in n blocks of size t, that is perfectly
secure against size-k coalitions. If all parties in each block come together and consolidate
their information even into a single bit, the number of blocks against which the scheme
remains secure drops to k/t. In general this is the best possible, with linear schemes providing
tight examples.
The following corollary, proven in the full version, shows that if the distribution over
shares is symmetric then much better security against this type of attack can be obtained.
I Corollary 20. Let f1, . . . , fn : {0, 1}t → {0, 1}. Assume X,Y are k-wise indistinguishable
symmetrically distributed random variables over tn-bit strings. Write X = X1 . . . Xn, Y =
Y1 . . . Yn, where all blocks Xi, Yi have size t. For every K, the n-bit random variables
X ′ = f1(X1) . . . fn(Xn) and Y ′ = f1(Y1) . . . fn(Yn) are O((tK)3/2nKe−k
2/1156tK)-close to
being perfectly K-wise indistinguishable, assuming K ≤ n/64.
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A Proof of Claim 18
The objective is to uniformly bound the value of the function
hδ(s) = C2w ·
∏
z∈Zw
hδ(s, z), where hδ(s, z) = (s− z)2 + δ(1− z2)
for s ∈ [−1, 1]. When k,K are fixed and n becomes large, all zeros in Zw approach −1 or
+1, hδ(s, z) uniformly approaches h0(s, z) = (s− z)2, hw(s) approaches h0(s) = p∞w (s) and
is therefore uniformly bounded.
The main difficulty in extending this argument to finite n is that hδ(s, z) can no longer be
uniformly bounded by a multiple of (s−z)2 since when s equals z, the latter function vanishes
but the former one doesn’t. For this reason, we divide the analysis into two parameter
regimes. When s is bounded away from the set of zeros Zw, an approximation of the infinitary
term-by-term argument can be carried out. When s is near the zeroes, we argue that hδ(s)
cannot be much larger than hδ(s0) for an s0 that is even farther away from Zw, and then
argue that h0(s0) = pw(s0)2 must be small because it represents the square of a probability
of a rare event.
I Fact 21. hδ(s, z)hδ(s,−z) = hδ(−s, z)hδ(−s,−z).
I Fact 22. hδ(s, z) ≤ hδ(|s|, z) when z ≤ 0 and s ≥ 0.
I Fact 23. hδ(s, z) ≤ hδ(s0, z) when s0 ≤ s ≤ 1, s0 ≤ 2z − 1, and |z| ≤ 1.
Proof. The fact is equivalent to checking that (s0 − z)2 − (s− z)2 ≥ 0 when s0 ≤ s ≤ 1 and
s0 ≤ 2z − 1. If s ≤ z then we have that s0 ≤ s ≤ z from which it immediately follows that
(s0 − z)2 ≥ (s− z)2. If s > z then (s− z)2 is at most (1− z)2. However, since |z| ≤ 1, we
have that s0 ≤ 2z − 1 ≤ z and thus (s0 − z)2 is always at least (z − (2z − 1))2 = (1− z)2.
Again we have that (s0 − z)2 ≥ (s− z)2. J
We begin by reducing to the case of non-negative inputs s ∈ [0, 1].
B Claim 24. Assuming w ≤ K/2, hδ(s) ≤ hδ(|s|).
Proof. When w ≤ K/2 then elements of Zw (3) can be split into w pairs of the form
A = {(−1 + 2h/n, 1 − 2h/n) : 0 ≤ h < w}, and K − 2w remaining elements B = {−1 +
2h/n : w ≤ h < K − w} are all non-positive. By Fact 21, ∏(−z,z)∈A hδ(s, z)hδ(s,−z) =∏
(−z,z)∈A hδ(|s|, z)hδ(|s|,−z). By Fact 22,
∏
z∈B hδ(s, z) ≤
∏
z∈B hδ(|s|, z). Therefore the
product
∏
z∈Zw hδ(s, z) ≤
∏
z∈Zw hδ(|s|, z). C
The following claim handles values of s in the range [0, 1− w/16K].
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B Claim 25. Assuming 0 ≤ s ≤ 1− w/16K,
hδ(s, z) ≤
{
(1 + δ)(s− z)2, if z ≤ −1/√2.
(1 + (64K/w)δ)(s− z)2, if z ≥ 1− w/32K
Proof. The ratio hδ(s, z)/(s−z)2 equals 1+((1−z2)/(s−z)2)δ. The number (1−z2)/(s−z)2
is at most 1 when s ≥ 0 and z ≤ −1/√2 and at most the following when z ≥ 1− w/32K.
1− (1− w/32K)2
((1− w/16K)− (1− w/32K))2 ≤
2w/32K
(w/32K)2 = 64K/w. C
I Corollary 26. Assuming 0 ≤ s ≤ 1− w/16K and n ≥ 64K, hδ(s) ≤ e65δKh0(s).
Proof. By the choice of parameters, all zeros in Z− meet the criterion for the first inequality
in Claim 25, while all zeros in Z+ meet the criterion for the second one. Therefore
hδ(s) = C2w
∏
z∈Z−
hδ(s, z)
∏
z∈Z+
hδ(s, z)
≤ C2w
∏
z∈Z−
(1 + δ)(s− z)2
∏
z∈Z+
(1 + (64K/w)δ)(s− z)2
≤ (1 + δ)K−w(1 + (64K/w)δ)w · C2w
∏
z∈Z−
h0(s, z)
∏
z∈Z+
h0(s, z)
≤ eδK · e64δK · h0(s).
J
The following two claims handle values of s in the range [1− w/16K, 1].
B Claim 27. Assuming w ≤ K and 1− w/8K ≤ s0 ≤ 1− w/16K ≤ s ≤ 1,
hδ(s, z) ≤
{
hδ(s0, z), if z ≥ 1− w/32K
(1 + w/8K)2 · hδ(s0, z), if z ≤ −w/8K.
Proof. By the choice of parameters the first inequality follows from Fact 23. For the second
one, we upper bound the ratio
(s− z)2
(s0 − z)2 ≤
(1− z)2
(1− z − w/8K)2 =
(
1 + w/8K1− z − w/8K
)2
≤
(
1 + w8K
)2
.
This is greater than one, so (s − z)2 + δ(1 − z2) ≤ (1 + w/8K)2((s0 − z)2 + δ(1 − z2)) as
desired. C
I Corollary 28. Assuming 1 − w/8K ≤ s0 ≤ 1 − w/16K ≤ s ≤ 1 and n ≥ 2K, hδ(s) ≤
ew/4hδ(s0).
Proof. By the choice of parameters, all zeros in Z− meet the criterion for the first inequality
in Claim 27, while all zeros in Z+ meet the criterion for the second one. Therefore
hδ(s) = C2w
∏
z∈Z−
hδ(s, z)
∏
z∈Z+
hδ(s, z)
≤ C2w
∏
z∈Z−
(1 + w/8K)2 · hδ(s0, z)
∏
z∈Z+
hδ(s0, z)
= (1 + w/8K)2|Z−| · hδ(s0)
≤ (1 + w/8K)2K · hδ(s0) ≤ ew/4hδ(s0). J
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B Claim 29. If s0 is of the form 1 − 2h/n for some integer 0 ≤ h ≤ wn/e2K then
0 ≤ pw(s0) ≤ e−w.
Proof. By Fact 11, pw(s0) is the probability that a random string of Hamming weight h and
length n has exactly w ones in its first K positions. The probability that it has at least w
ones in its first K positions is at most(
K
w
)
· h
n
· h− 1
n− 1 · · ·
h− w + 1
n− w + 1 ≤
(
eK
w
)w(
h
n
)w
≤ e−w. C
Proof of Claim 18. By Claim 24 we may assume s ∈ [0, 1]. When 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 − w/16K the
result follows from Corollary 26. When 1− w/16K ≤ |s| ≤ 1, by the assumption n ≥ 64K
there must exist a value s0 between 1− w/8K and 1− w/16K that is of the form 1− 2h/n.
In particular h ≤ wn/e2K. Then
hδ(s) ≤ ew/4hδ(s0) ≤ ew/4e65δKpw(s0)2 ≤ e65δK−7w/4,
where the inequalities follow from Corollary 28, Corollary 26, and Claim 29, respectively.
C
B Proofs of Corollary 4 and Theorem 5
B.1 Proof of Corollary 4
Proof of Corollary 4. Corollary 3 implies the existence of a φ
(
= µ−ν2
)
satisfying ‖φ‖1 =
1, 〈f, φ〉 = ε for some ε = Ω(1) and 〈φ, q〉 ≤ K3/2 · 2−Ω
(
d˜eg1/3(f)2/K
)
for any parity of degree
at most K.
For any p of degree K and weight at most w,
‖f − p‖∞ = ‖f − p‖∞‖φ‖1 ≥ 〈φ, f − p〉 = 〈φ, f〉− 〈φ, p〉 ≥ ε−w ·K3/2 · 2−Ω
(
d˜eg1/3(f)2/K
)
.
Thus, we conclude that Wε/2(f,K) = K−3/2 · 2Ω
(
d˜eg1/3(f)2/K
)
. Corollary 4 now follows
using standard error reduction techniques that show that d˜egε(f) = Θ(d˜eg1/3(f)) for all
constants 0 < ε < 1/2. J
B.2 Proof of Theorem 5
We first require the following lemma. This lemma builds on ideas in [23, Claim 2], which
showed a similar result for t = Θ(1).
I Lemma 30. For any y ∈ {0, 1}n, denote by EQy the function on {0, 1}n that outputs 1 on
input y, and 0 otherwise. Then for any t > 0 and d >
√
nt logn, we have Wn−O(t)(EQy, d) ≤
2O(nt log2(n)/d).
Proof. Note that for any y ∈ {−1, 1}n, the function EQy is just the AND function on n
input bits (with 0-1 valued output), with possibly negated input variables. Thus it suffices
to give an approximating polynomial for the AND function on n bits. We now express ANDn
as AND` ◦ ANDn/`, where ` is a parameter we will set later. We compute the inner ANDn/`
exactly and approximate the outer AND` to error n−Ω(t). This can be done with a polynomial
p of degree O
(√
` log(nt)
)
[15, 6]. Combining the fact that p is bounded by 1 + n−Ω(t) ≤ 2
at all Boolean inputs with Parseval’s identity and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, it can
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be seen that the weight of p is at most `O
(√
` log(nt)
)
.12 It is well known that the exact
multilinear polynomial representation of ANDn/` has constant weight. Hence, by composing p
with the multilinear polynomial that exactly computes ANDn/`, we obtain an approximation
q for ANDn of degree O
(
n
√
t logn
`
)
, error n−Ω(t), and weight 2O
(√
`t log3 n
)
. We now fix the
value of ` to ` := n
2t logn
d2 < n, thereby ensuring that the degree of q is at most d. With this
setting of `, the weight of q is at most 2O(nt log2(n)/d), proving the lemma. J
Proof of Theorem 5. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be any symmetric function, corresponding
to the univariate predicate Df : {0} ∪ [n] → {0, 1}n. For the purpose of this proof, let us
denote by kf the smallest i for which f is constant on inputs of Hamming weight in the
interval [i + 1, n − i − 1]. Without loss of generality, f(x) = 0 for strings of x Hamming
weight between kf + 1 and n− kf − 1. The case where f = 1 on input strings of Hamming
weight between kf + 1 and n − kf − 1 can be proved using a similar argument. Define
supp(f) := {x ∈ {0, 1}n : f(x) = 1}. Note that |supp(f)| ≤ 2 · nkf .
Observe that f(x) =
∑
y∈supp(f) EQy(x). Lemma 30 implies, for each y ∈ supp(f), the
existence of polynomials py of degree K and weight 2O(nkf log
2(n)/K), which approximate EQy
to error 16 · n−kf . Define a polynomial p : {0, 1}n → R by p(x) =
∑
y∈supp(f) py(x). Clearly
p has degree K, weight at most nO(kf ) · 2O(nkf log2(n)/K) = 2O˜(nkf/K), and error at most
|supp(f)| · n−kf /6 ≤ 1/3, where the upper bounds on the weight and error follow from the
triangle inequality.
The theorem now follows standard error reduction techniques and Paturi’s theorem [21],
which states that for symmetric functions, d˜eg(f) = Θ
(√
n · kf
)
. J
I Remark 31. The upper bound obtained in Theorem 5 is more general than as stated,
and the only property of symmetric functions it exploits is that symmetric functions of low
approximate degree are highly biased. More specifically, the proof of Theorem 5 shows that any
function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} with min{|f−1(0)|, |f−1(1)|} ≤ nt satisfies Wε(f,K) ≤ 2O˜(nt/K)
for any K ≥ √nt logn.
C Proof of Theorem 6
Proof outline. As we explain in more detail in the proof itself, it is sufficient to establish
the theorem for fixed k and K and infinitely many n because the statement is downward
reducible in n.
Using the Chebyshev approximation formulas from Section 3 we derive explicit lower
bounds on the large Chebyshev coefficients on the polynomial p0 representing the distinguish-
ing advantage of the AND function on K inputs. Owing to orthogonality and boundedness
of the Chebyshev polynomials, this is a lower bound on the approximate degree of ANDK .
By strong duality as given in the following Claim (see [4]) we obtain Theorem 6.
B Claim 32. If d˜egε/2(Fn) ≥ k then there exists a pair of perfectly k-wise indistinguishable
distributions µ, ν over {0, 1}n such that EX∼µ[Fn(X)]− EY∼ν [Fn(Y )] ≥ ε.
12Building on [6], It is possible to derive explicit ε-approximating polynomials for AND where the degree
is O
(√
` log(1/ε)
)
and the weight is 2O
(√
` log(1/ε
)
rather than `O
(√
` log(1/ε)
)
. Using this tighter
weight bound would improve our final result by a factor of logn in the exponent. We omit this tighter
result for brevity.
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Recall that the Chebyshev polynomials are orthogonal under the measure dσ(t) =
(1 − t2)−1/2dt supported on [−1, 1]. We will need the following identity for their average
square magnitude under this measure:
Et∼σ[Td(t)2] = 1/2 when d > 0. (8)
Proof of Theorem 6. By symmetry of the distinguishers, µ and ν can be assumed symmetric.
Let Fn denote the function on {0, 1}n that outputs ANDK
(
x|{1,...,K}
)
, i.e., Fn outputs the
AND of the first K < n bits of the input. We prove the theorem for Gn(x1, . . . , xn) =
NOR(x|{1,...,K}). By the symmetry of 0 and 1 inputs the theorem also holds for Fn.
First, we claim that the statement of Theorem 6 is stronger as n becomes larger, so it
is sufficient to prove it in the limiting case when n approaches infinity and k,K are fixed.
Suppose that µ and ν are distributions over n bit strings that are k-wise indistinguishable
yet are ε-reconstructable by Gn. We must show that there are distributions µ′ and ν′ over
{0, 1}n−1 are k-wise indistinguishable yet are ε-reconstructable by Gn−1. But this holds for
µ′ (respectively ν′) that generate a random sample from µ (respectively, ν) and then throw
away the last bit.
If the statement was false then by Claim 32 there would exist degree-k polynomials G˜n
that approximate Gn pointwise on {0, 1}n to within error ε =
√
2−4K+1
∑
d>K
( 2K
K+d
)2 for
almost all n. Applying the construction from the proof of Fact 11 to G˜n, there exist univariate
degree-k polynomials p˜n0 approximating pn0 on the set of pointsWn = {−1+2h/n : 0 ≤ h ≤ n}
to within error ε. We emphasize the dependence on n as it will play a role in the proof.
By Formula (3) the polynomial pn0 has the form
pn0 (t) = Cn0
∏
z∈Zn0
(t− z),
where Zn0 = {−1 + 2h/n : 0 ≤ h < K} (the set Z+ is empty). The value p0n(1) is the
probability that Gn accepts the all-zero string, so it must equal one. The constant Cn0 must
therefore equal
∏
z∈Zn0 (1− z)
−1. As n tends to infinity, the set Z0 converges to a single zero
at −1 of multiplicity K, so the sequence pn0 converges uniformly to the polynomial
p∞0 (t) = 2−K(t+ 1)K .
By the triangle inequality, for every δ > 0 and all sufficiently large n, p˜n0 is within ε + δ
of p∞0 on the set Wn. A degree-k polynomial is determined by its values on Wk+1 and the
set of degree-k polynomials that are within ε + δ of p∞0 on Wk+1 is compact. Therefore
the sequence of approximating polynomials p˜n0 must contain a subsequence (for values of n
that are multiples of k + 1) that converges (uniformly) to a limiting degree-k polynomial
p˜∞0 . Since p˜n0 is within ε+ δ of pn0 on Wn for infinitely many n, p˜∞0 must be within ε+ 2δ
of p∞0 on Wn for infinitely many n. The union of these sets Wn is dense in [−1, 1], and by
continuity p∞0 can be ε + δ-approximated by the degree-k polynomial p˜∞0 everywhere on
[−1, 1]. As δ was arbitrary it follows that the ε-approximate degree of p∞0 can be at most k.
All that remains to prove that this is not true, i.e., to show a lower bound of k on the
ε-approximate degree of p∞0 . This lower bound is known (see, e.g., [13]); we provide the
details in the full version. J
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